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This theme issue has the founding ambition of landscaping Data Ethics as a new branch 
of ethics that studies and evaluates moral problems related to data (including generation, 
recording, curation, processing, dissemination, sharing, and use), algorithms (including 
AI, artificial agents, machine learning, and robots), and corresponding practices 
(including responsible innovation, programming, hacking, and professional codes), in 
order to formulate and support morally good solutions (e.g. right conducts or right 
values). Data Ethics builds on the foundation provided by Computer and Information 
Ethics but, at the same time, it refines the approach endorsed so far in this research field, 
by shifting the Level of Abstraction of ethical enquiries, from being information-centric 
to being data-centric. This shift brings into focus the different moral dimensions of all 
kinds of data, even the data that never translate directly into information but can be used 
to support actions or generate behaviours, for example. It highlights the need for ethical 
analyses to concentrate on the content and nature of computational operations—the 
interactions among hardware, software, and data—rather than on the variety of digital 
technologies that enables them. And it emphasises the complexity of the ethical 
challenges posed by Data Science. Because of such complexity, Data Ethics should be 
developed from the start as a macroethics, that is, as an overall framework that avoids 
narrow, ad hoc approaches and addresses the ethical impact and implications of Data 
Science and its applications within a consistent, holistic, and inclusive framework. Only 
as a macroethics Data Ethics will provide the solutions that can maximise the value of 
Data Science for our societies, for all of us, and for our environments. 
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Data Science provides huge opportunities to improve private and public life, as well as 
our environments (consider the development of smart cities or the problems caused by 
carbon emission). Unfortunately, such opportunities are also coupled to significant 
ethical challenges. The extensive use of increasingly more data—often personal if not 
sensitive (Big Data)—the growing reliance on algorithms to analyse them in order to 
shape choices and to make decisions (including machine learning, AI, and robotics), as 
well as the gradual reduction of human involvement or even oversight over many 
automatic processes pose pressing issues of fairness, responsibility, and respect of human 
rights, among others.  
These ethical challenges can be addressed successfully. Fostering the 
development and applications of Data Science while ensuring the respect of human 
rights and of the values shaping open, pluralistic, and tolerant information societies is a 
great opportunity of which we can and must take advantage. Striking such a robust 
balance will not be an easy or simple task. But the alternative, failing to advance both the 
ethics and the science of data, would have regrettable consequences. On the one hand, 
overlooking ethical issues may prompt negative impact and social rejection, as it was the 
case, for example, of the NHS care.data programme.1 Social acceptability or, even better, 
social preferability must be the guiding principles for any Data Science project with even a 
remote impact on human life, to ensure that opportunities will not be missed. On the 
other hand, overemphasizing the protection of individual rights in the wrong contexts 
may lead to regulations that are too rigid, and this in turn can cripple the chances to 
harness the social value of Data Science. The LIBE amendments initially proposed to the 
European Data Protection Regulation offer a concrete example of the case in point.2  
Navigating between the Scylla of social rejection and the Charybdis of legal 
prohibition in order to reach solutions that maximise the ethical value of Data Science to 
benefit our societies, all of us, and our environments is the demanding task of Data 
Ethics. In achieving this task, Data Ethics can build on the foundation provided by 
Computer and Information Ethics, which has focused for the past thirty years on the 
main challenges posed by digital technologies (Floridi 2013; Bynum 2015; Miller and 
Taddeo 2017). This rich legacy is most valuable. It also fruitfully grafts Data Ethics onto 
the great tradition of ethics more generally. At the same time, Data Ethics refines the 
approach endorsed so far in Computer and Information Ethics, as it changes the Levels 
																																								 																					
1 See https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/tsd/care-data/ 




of Abstraction (LoA) of ethical enquiries from an information-centric (LoAI) to a data-
centric one (LoAD).
3  
 Ethical analyses are developed at a variety of LoAs. The shift from LoAI to LoAD 
is the latest in a series of changes that has characterised the evolution of Computer and 
Information Ethics. Research in this field first endorsed a human-centric LoA (Parker 
1968), which addressed the ethical problems posed by the dissemination of computers in 
terms of professional responsibilities of both their designers and users. The LoA then 
shifted to a computer-centric one (LoAC) in the mid 1980s (Moor 1985), and it changed 
again at the beginning of the second millennium to LoAI (Floridi 2006). 
These changes responded to rapid, widespread, and profound technological 
transformations. And they had important conceptual implications. For example, LoAC 
highlighted the nature of computers as universal and malleable tools. It made it easier to 
understand the impact that computers could have on shaping social dynamics as well as 
on the design of the environment surrounding us (Moor 1985). LoAI then shifted the 
focus from the technological means to the content (information) that can be created, 
recorded, processed, and shared through such means. In doing so, LoAI emphasised the 
different moral dimensions of information—i.e., information as the source, the result, or 
the target of moral actions—and led to the design of a macroethical approach able to 
address the whole cycle of information creation, sharing, storage, protection, usage, and 
possible destruction (Floridi 2006).  
Data Science, as the latest phase of the information revolution, is now prompting 
a further change in the LoA at which our ethical analysis can be developed most 
fruitfully. In a few decades, we have come to understand that it is not a specific 
technology (computers, tablets, mobile phones, online platforms, cloud computing and 
so forth), but what any digital technology manipulates that represents the correct focus 
of our ethical strategies. The shift from information ethics to data ethics is probably more 
semantic than conceptual, but it does highlight the need to concentrate on what is being 
handled as the true invariant of our concerns. This is why labels such as “robo-ethics” or 
“machine ethics” miss the point, anachronistically stepping back to a time when 
																																								 																					
3 The method of abstraction is a common methodology in Computer Science (Hoare 1972) and in 
Philosophy and Ethics of Information (Floridi 2008). It specifies the different LoAs at which a system can 
be analysed, by focusing on different aspects, called observables. The choice of the observables depends on 
the purpose of the analysis and determines the choice of LoA. Any given system can be analysed at 
different LoAs. For example, an engineer interested in maximising the aerodynamics of a car may focus 
upon the shape of its parts, their weight, and the materials. A customer interested in the aesthetics of the 
same car may focus on its colour and on the overall look and may disregard the shape, weights, and 




“computer ethics” seemed to provide the right perspective. It is not the hardware that 
causes ethical problems, it is what the hardware does with the software and the data that 
represents the source of our new difficulties. LoAD brings into focus the different moral 
dimensions of data. In doing so, it highlights the fact that, before concerning 
information, ethical problems such as privacy, anonymity, transparency, trust, and 
responsibility concern data collection, curation, analysis, and use, and hence they are 
better understood at that level.  
In light of this change of LoA, Data Ethics can be defined as the branch of ethics 
that studies and evaluates moral problems related to data (including generation, 
recording, curation, processing, dissemination, sharing, and use), algorithms (including 
AI, artificial agents, machine learning, and robots), and corresponding practices 
(including responsible innovation, programming, hacking, and professional codes), in 
order to formulate and support morally good solutions (e.g. right conducts or right 
values). This means that the ethical challenges posed by Data Science can be mapped 
within the conceptual space delineated by three axes of research: the ethics of data, the 
ethics of algorithms, and the ethics of practises.  
 The ethics of data focuses on ethical problems posed by the collection and 
analysis of large dataset and on issues ranging from the use of Big Data in biomedical 
research and social sciences (Mittelstadt and Floridi 2015), to profiling, advertising 
(Hildebrandt 2008), and data philanthropy (Kirkpatrick 2013; Taddeo forthcoming) as 
well as open data (Kitchin 2014). In this context, key issues concern possible re-
identification of individuals through data-mining, -linking, -merging, and re-using of large 
datasets, as well as risks for so-called “group privacy”, when the identification of types of 
individuals, independently of the de-identification of each of them, may lead to serious 
ethical problems, from group discrimination (e.g. ageism, ethnicism, sexism) to group-
targeted forms of violence (Floridi 2014; Taylor, Floridi, and van der Sloot 
Forthcoming).  Trust (Taddeo 2010; Taddeo and Floridi 2011) and transparency (Turilli 
and Floridi 2009) are also crucial topics in the ethics of data, in connection with an 
acknowledged lack of public awareness of the benefits, opportunities, risks, and 
challenges associated with Data Science (Drew forthcoming). For example, transparency 
is often advocated as one of the measures that may foster trust. However, it is unclear 




 The ethics of algorithms addresses issues posed by the increasing complexity and 
autonomy of algorithms broadly understood (e.g. including AI and artificial agents such 
as internet bots), especially in the case of machine learning applications. In this case, 
some crucial challenges include moral responsibility and accountability of both designers 
and data scientists with respect to unforeseen and undesired consequences as well as 
missed opportunities (Floridi 2012; Floridi forthcoming). Unsurprisingly, the ethical 
design and auditing (Goodman and Flaxman 2016) of algorithms’ requirements and the 
assessment of potential, undesirable outcomes (e.g. discrimination or the promotion of 
anti-social content) is attracting increasing research. 
Finally, the ethics of practices (including professional ethics and deontology) 
addresses the pressing questions concerning the responsibilities and liabilities of people 
and organisations in charge of data processes, strategies, and policies, including data 
scientists, with the goal to define an ethical framework to shape professional codes about 
responsible innovation, development, and usage, which may ensure ethical practises 
fostering both the progress of Data Science and the protection of the rights of 
individuals and groups (Leonelli forthcoming). Three issues are central in this line of 
analysis: consent, users privacy, and secondary use.  
While they are distinct lines of research, the ethics of data, algorithms, and 
practices are obviously intertwined, and this is why it may be preferable to speak in terms 
of three axes defining a conceptual space within which ethical problems are like points 
identified by three values. Most of them do not lie on a single axis. For example, analyses 
focusing on data privacy will also address issues concerning consent and professional 
responsibilities. Likewise, ethical auditing of algorithms often implies analyses of the 
responsibilities of their designers, developers, users, and adopters. Data Ethics must 
address the whole conceptual space and hence all the three axes of research together, 
even if with different priorities and focus. And for this reason, Data Ethics needs to be 
developed from the start as a macroethics, that is, as an overall “geometry” of the ethical 
space that avoids narrow, ad hoc approaches but rather addresses the diverse set of ethical 
implications of Data Science within a consistent, holistic, and inclusive framework.  
This theme issue represents a significant step in such a constructive direction. It 
collects fourteen contributions, each analysing a specific topic belonging to one of the 
three axes of research outlined above, while considering its implications for the other 
two. The articles included in this issue were initially presented at a workshop on “The 
Ethics of Data Science, The Landscape for the Alan Turing Institute” hosted at the 
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University of Oxford in December 2015. The issue shares with the workshop the 
founding ambition of landscaping Data Ethics as a new area of ethical enquiries and to 
identify the most pressing problems to solve and the most relevant lines of research to 
develop. 
Before leaving the reader to the articles, we would like to express our gratitude to 
the authors and the reviewers for their contributions, as well as to the Alan Turing 
Institute for funding the landscaping workshop as part of its research strategy. The 
workshop and this special issue would not have been possible without the strong support 
and continuous encouragement of many colleagues, but in particular of Professor Helen 
Margetts, Director of the Oxford Internet Institute, and of Professor Andrew Blake, 
Director of the Alan Turing Institute. We are also grateful to Bailey Fallon, the journal’s 
Commissioning Editor, and to the editorial office of Philosophical Transaction A for their 
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